We present a model of cooperative problem solving that describes the process from its beginning, with some agent recognising the potential for cooperation with respect to one of its goals, through to team action. Our approach i s t o c haracterise the mental states of the agents that leads them to solicit, and take part in, cooperative action. The model is formalised by expressing it as a theory in a quanti ed multi-modal logic.
Introduction
Agents | both human and arti cial | can engage in many and varied types of social interaction, ranging from altruistic cooperation through to open con ict. However, perhaps the paradigm example of social interaction is cooperative problem solving CPS, in which a group of autonomous agents choose to work together to achieve a common goal. For example, we might nd a group of people working together to move a heavy object, play a symphony, build a house, or write a joint paper. In short, the aim of this paper is to develop a formal model of such cooperative problem solving.
Researchers working with the tools of game and economic theory have developed a number of models that attempt to explain various aspects of the cooperative problem solving process. Relevant examples include the circumstances under which cooperation can occur in a society of self-interested autonomous agents 1 and how negotiation protocols can be designed to ensure that for example truth-telling is the optimal strategy 23 . However, these models typically make assumptions that render them of limited value in many practical situations we discuss the limitations of game-theoretic models in more detail in section 2.2. One of our aims in this article is, therefore, to present a formal model of CPS that is inherently more suitable as a computational model | we elaborate on this issue in section 7. Moreover, we wish the model to be comprehensive, in that it should cover the entire CPS process | from recognition of the need for cooperation through to completed team action. In more detail, the model consists of four stages: recognition | in which an agent identi es the potential for cooperation; team formation | in which the agent solicits assistance; plan formation | in which the newly formed collective attempts to construct an agreed joint plan; and nally, execution | in which members of the collective play out the roles they have negotiated.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the idea of CPS by way of some simple motivating examples. In order to formally express this model, a new quanti ed multi-modal logic had to be devised, for representing the beliefs, goals, and actions of agents and groups of agents. This logic is informally introduced in section 3 a complete formal de nition of its syntax and semantics is given in Appendix A. The logic is used to formalise the notions of conventions, commitments, and intentions in section 4. These de nitions are subsequently used in our model of CPS, which is presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses the properties of the model, and some conclusions and open issues are presented in section 7.
Modelling CPS: Issues and Scope
Many aspects of CPS have been investigated by researchers from distributed articial intelligence, economics, philosophy, organisation science, and the social sciences. These models can be divided into two broad categories:
implementation-oriented models for realising cooperative systems, managing cooperative activities, and achieving coordination in cooperative systems at runtime 27, 7 ; and formal theories of cooperation and related issues; examples include economic and game-theoretic models of cooperation and negotiation 23 , formal models of communication based on speech act theory e.g., 6 , and models which typically use a multi-modal logic to describe the mental state of agents engaged in social activities 18, 2 2 , 1 1 . Implementation-oriented models are useful in that they help to identify the various steps of the CPS process. For example, consider the Contract Net protocol 27 . This protocol contains the following steps: i task announcement: an agent the manager nds it has a problem that it does not have the resources to solve locally, and broadcasts an announcement to this e ect; ii bidding: those agents that receive the announcement, and have the appropriate skills to help, send a bid to the manager, representing an o er to help; iii awarding: the manager awards the task to the most appropriate bidder, thus establishing a manager-contractor relationship between the two agents; and nally, iv expediting: the contractor carries out the task it has been awarded which m a y i n volve generating sub-tasks, and further, hierarchical managercontractor relationships. On completion of the task, the contractor informs the manager of the nal result.
On examination, the Contract Net protocol reveals the following stages of CPS: i there is a point at which a manager recognises the potential for social action; ii there is an announcement stage, during which the prospective manager attempts to solicit assistance with respect to the task; iii there is a negotiation stage, during which potential managers and contractors engage in a dialogue, with the aim of agreeing which agent will do what; and iv there is a subsequent execution stage, during which participants play out the roles they have negotiated. Examination of other models of CPS e.g., partial global planning 7 indicates the same basic stages. Given this commonality, these are the four stages that our CPS model must cover.
Now that we have a broad understanding of the key steps that appear to be common to most forms of CPS, we can begin to identify the key properties that our model must satisfy. Such desiderata are presented in section 2.1. We then go on to discuss the purpose of our model, and discuss why formalisation in symbolic logic is appropriate in section 2.2. In section 2.3, we discuss the di erent perspectives that such a model may take, and justify our choice of an internal perspective.
Desiderata for a Theory of Cooperative Problem Solving
Cooperation does not arise from a vacuum. It occurs because a group of agents believe they will in some way bene t from it. For example, an agent might believe that the cooperative solution to a problem is in some way better than a non-cooperative one: it may be more accurate or more up-to-date, for example. An adequate theory of cooperation should account for both the circumstances under which agents will begin to initiate cooperation and when they will initiate the social processes required to instantiate and complete cooperative actions. Agents will be mutually supportive. Cooperating agents will support one another during the execution of their joint action 3 . By this, we mean that agents will execute their part of the team's action, and will typically do what they can to ensure that the remainder of the team does likewise. An adequate theory of cooperation must describe the types of mutual support, when it should occur, and what form such support should take. Agents are r eactive. Any realistic environment is highly dynamic. Agents must recognise this, and respond accordingly to any changes that a ect their plans 33 . An adequate theory of cooperation must therefore recognise this reactive aspect of rational behaviour, and characterise the behaviour of the agents in such circumstances.
The Role of our CPS Model
Formalism in AI and multi-agent systems research plays many roles, which are too often confused. When presenting a logical theory of cooperative problem solving, it is therefore important to be precise about the role we expect the theory to play. In general, logical theories in multi-agent systems play one or more of the following roles: they can be exercises in formal philosophy, attempting to capture the properties of some human social activity in a precise way; they can be speci cations for future computer systems, which attempt to prescribe the way in which a rational, intelligent system should behave; or they can be knowledge representation formalisms, intended to be directly represented and manipulated within some system.
Our theory is primarily intended as a speci cation for future cooperative systems. We have taken a number of extant models of cooperation and cooperative activity and from them abstracted the common components. We have then formalised this model in a multi-modal logic. The model we have derived cannot be implemented directly, since the modal logic we use to express the model does not lend itself to direct execution. Direct execution of a logical formula corresponds to a constructive proof of satis ability for that formula. Even for propositional multi-modal logics of the type we consider in this paper, the satis ability problem is extremely complex 13 .
However, we argue that the model can be used to derive a set of data structures and algorithms that may be used to realise a cooperative system. We comment o n this issue further in section 7.
Why not Game Theory?
Game and economic theory has proved to be one of the most successful formalisms for understanding cooperative behaviour 23 . It helps us to understand the parameters of cooperation, how it can arise, under what circumstances it is likely to succeed, and so on. However, while game theory is a useful analytical tool, it is not generally a goodengineering tool, with which to build computational systems. This is primarily because of the type of representation employed by game theory. The building block o f game theory is the notion of utility, whereby agents are allocated a real-valued payo for every outcome in a particular encounter. A`rational' agent is then one that acts to maximise its expected payo in such an encounter.
Such simple abstractions lead to powerful models, that have been used to great effect in analysing the way an`ideal' agent w ould behave i n a m ulti-agent encounter 2 . However, game theoretic models are recognised to be idealisations of the way that agents would operate: they are not computational models, and ignore the practicalities of computing an appropriate action to perform 24 . Moreover, assuming the presence of a utility function, which assigns payo s to possible outcomes, is simply not practicable for many real-world problems. In this sense, game-theoretic models are simply too coarse-grained for direct implementation in real systems. For these reasons, we c hoose to express out model of CPS as a logical theory.
Components and Perspectives
When devising a model of cooperative activity, we must choose a perspective from which to view the activity. There are two alternatives: external and internal 26 . With an external perspective, the actions performed by the agents are studied in order to determine when and how w ell the agents are cooperating; with an internal perspective, the agent's internal state is used as the basis for evaluation. For the reasons described below, this work adopts an internal perspective.
The rst reason for using an internal approach is that it provides a high-level speci cation tool for the designer of a cooperating agent | it identi es the agent's key data structures, de nes the relationships which exist between these structures, and places some constraints on the values which the structures can take see 17 for an illustration of how a n i n ternal perspective model of cooperation was used to derive the high-level architecture of a social agent. The prescriptive nature of this approach contrasts with external models, which are mainly concerned with developing theories about agents, rather than on models which might be used by agents. To reiterate, we are not suggesting that the logic be used directly as a knowledge representation formalism or programming language.
The second reason for adopting an internal approach is that with the external perspective, it is sometimes di cult to distinguish between actions that are coordinated, but which one would not be inclined to call cooperative, and actions that are truly cooperative, in that the participating agents have a collective goal. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario 25 . A group of people are sitting in a park. As a result of a sudden downpour all of them run to a tree in the middle of the park because it is the only available source of shelter. This is not cooperative action. Each person has the intention of stopping themselves from becoming wet, and even if they are aware of what others are doing and what their goals are, it does not a ect their intended action. This contrasts with the situation in which the people are dancers, and the choreography calls for them to converge on a common point the tree. In this case, the individuals are performing exactly the same actions as before, but because they are performing these actions as a consequence of a shared goal, they can be regarded as performing a cooperative action. The external approach is not able to distinguish between the individuals trying to stay dry, and the cooperating dancers.
Having xed upon an internal perspective, the next stage is to identify and characterise the structures which control an agent's cooperative problem solving activities. These structures can be divided into two categories: i those related to individual behaviour, and ii those that are responsible for guiding social behaviour. A n umberof researchers believe that joint action can be reduced solely to individual mental states; whereas others believe that individual behaviour is equivalent to social behaviour in which the groups have precisely one element. Our CPS model requires both individual and societal features to be present. Group constructs such as teams, joint goals, joint commitments, and so on are a natural tool for describing social activity; however, since it is the individuals who ultimately have the ability to act, there must be a clear mapping to the individual mental states of the participating agents. We therefore de ne social attitudes in terms of individual attitudes: following 5, 1 8 , we take individual beliefs and goals to be primitive, and de ne other constructs, including those which c haracterise collective mental states, in terms of them.
A Formal Framework
This section gives an overview of the formal framework in which the model of CPS will be expressed; a complete formal de nition is given in Appendix A. This framework is a quanti ed, sorted multi-modal logic, which both draws upon and extends the work described in 5, 22, 3 0 . The logic can be viewed as the well-known branching time logic CTL* 8 , enriched by the addition of some further modal connectives for referring to the beliefs and goals of agents, together with a simple apparatus for representing the actions performed by agents, which makes use of some ideas from dynamic logic 14 .
First, it is worth saying a few words about the models that underpin the logic. Intuitively, a model is a time tree, with paths through the tree representing possible histories of the environment. The tree will be nite in the past i.e, there was a`start' of time, and in nite in the future i.e., there is no`end' of time. Time is linear in the past, and branches into the future. Nodes in the temporal tree structure are referred to as states, for they correspond to states of the environment. Arcs in the branching time structure are labelled with primitive actions. The performance of such an action transforms one state into another. We do not require that actions are deterministic. Each primitive action is associated with a single agent, that performs the action.
The logic is quanti ed and many-sorted; for simplicity, w e do not allow functional terms in the language other than constants. Terms come in four sorts. First, we have terms that denote agents, and we use i ; j ; : : : and so on as variables ranging over agents. In addition, we h a ve terms that denote sets of agents, i.e., groups | we use g;g 0 ; : : : as variables ranging over groups of agents. Next, we h a ve terms that denote sequences of actions | w e use ; 0 ; : : : as terms denoting sequences of actions. The role that such terms play will become clear later. Finally, w e h a ve terms that denote other objects in the environment | bits of string, cars, tables, blocks, and so on.
We will use a ; b ; : : : to stand for such individuals. The actual logical apparatus of quanti cation is standard for quanti ed many-sorted logics.
The logic makes a distinction between formulae that express properties of states, and formulae that express properties of paths, or histories through the temporal tree structure. The former are known as state formulae, the latter as path formulae. We begin our introduction by discussing the various state formulae operators see Table 1 for an overview of the state and path operators in the logic. First, we h a ve a n ullary operator true: a logical constant for truth. This formula will be satis ed wherever it is evaluated. Next, we h a ve operators Bel i ' and Goal i ' , which mean that agent i has a belief and goal of ' respectively. An agent's beliefs intuitively correspond to the information that the agent has about its environment. For example, an agent might believe that the temperature of the room is 20 degrees celcius, or that Bill Clinton is a liar. Agents can have nested beliefs; thus an agent might believe that Bill Clinton did not believe of himself that he was a liar. For technical reasons, we require that an agent only believes state formulae. The formal semantics for belief are given in terms of`possible worlds' 4 . The restrictions to be imposed on the language model theory ensure a belief logic of KD45, which t h us implies that belief is consistent and closed under implication, and that an agent i s a ware of what it does and does not believe. The modal system KD45 is widely recognised as a logic of idealised belief 12 .
Turning to goals, the idea is that an agent's goals represent those states of a airs that, ideally, i t w ould like to bring about. For example, an agent might h a ve a goal that the temperature in the room be 20 degrees celcius, or might h a ve a goal that Bill Clinton be impeached. As with beliefs, an agent's goals must be state formulae, and the semantics of goals are also given in terms of possible worlds. Restrictions on the semantics of goals ensure that the logic of goals corresponds to a modal logic KD, i.e., the modal system D 4 . Thus goals are closed under implication, and are consistent.
In addition to these two modal connectives, we h a ve rst-order equality: a formula = 0 will be true if and 0 denote the same individual. The 2 operator allows us to relate agents to groups of agents. It has the expected set-theoretic interpretation, so i 2 g means that the agent denoted by i is a member of the group denoted by g.
In order to allow us to represent the agents required to perform a sequence of actions, we have an operator Agts. This operator takes two arguments: the rst is a term denoting a sequence of actions, the second is a term denoting a set of agents. Thus Agts g means that the group denoted by g are precisely the agents required to perform the actions in the action sequence denoted by . We allow state formulae to be combined using the usual connectives of classical logic:`:' for`not',`_' for`or',^' and,`' implies, and so on. We n o w consider path formulae. As we noted above, the idea is that path formulae express properties of a single path through a branching time structure. The main operator for expressing the properties of paths is`Happens'. This operator takes a single argument: an action expression, and expresses the fact that this action expression is the rst thing that happens on the path. Action expressions closely resemble the programs of dynamic logic, so the path formula Happens will be satis ed on some path if the program is the rst thing to occur on the path.
Action expressions are formed using constructions that are well-known from dynamic logic:`;' for sequential composition,`j' for non-deterministic choice,`' for Happens action expression happens next Table 1 : A summary of primitive operators in the logic iteration, and`?' for test actions. Thus the path formula Happens ; 0 means action happens rst on the path, and is immediately followed by 0 . The formula Happens j 0 means either or 0 happen rst on the path. The formula Happens means that the action occurs one or more times at the start of the path. Finally, the formula Happens '? means that the formula ' is satis ed in the rst state of the path. Here, ' must be a state formula. As with state formulae, compound path formulae can be made by combining path formulae using the standard logical connectives`:' for`not',`_' for`or', and so on. State and path formulae are related to one another through path quanti ers, a concept borrowed from branching temporal logic 8 . The logic contains two such path quanti ers:`A', which means`on all paths', and`E', which means`on some path'. These path quanti ers are unary modal connectives that are applied to path formulae to make state formulae. Thus A' is a state formula, which will be satis ed in some state if the path formula ' is satis ed on all the paths through the temporal tree structure that originate from that state. The formula E' is a state formula, which will be satis ed in some state if ' is satis ed on at least one path through the temporal tree structure that originates from that state.
Some Derived Operators
A n umber of derived operators will now b e i n troduced. First, the usual connectives of linear temporal logic: ' U means ' is satis ed until becomes satis ed; ' means ' is eventually satis ed; ' means ' is always satis ed. These connectives are used to build path formulae. The path quanti er E is the dual of A; t h us E' means ' is a path formulae satis ed on at least one possible future. We will have a n umber of occasions to write AHappens , action occurs next in all alternative futures, and A:Happens action does not occur next in any alternative future, and so we i n troduce abbreviations for these structures. Finally, we nd it convenient to make use of mutual mental states, although we recognise that such states are idealisations, not realisable in any system that admits the possibility of communication failure 9 . The mutual belief of ' in a group of agents g is written M-Bel g ' , and the mutual goal of ' in g is written M-Goal g '. We
give the full de nition of mutual belief, but omit that for M-Goal, since it is essentially identical. Mutual belief is de ned via an`everyone believes' operator, E-Bel, which plays the role of the`everyone knows' operator in knowledge theory see, e.g., 9, p23 .
Commitments, Conventions, and Intentions
The key mental states that control agent behaviour in our model are intentions and joint i n tentions | the former de ne local asocial behaviour, the latter control social behaviour. Intentions are so central because they provide both the stability and predictability that is necessary for social interaction, and the exibility and reactivity that is necessary to cope with a changing environment. Previous attempts to formalise commitment h a ve not distinguished between the commitment that underpins an intention and the associated convention. We clearly distinguish the two concepts: a commitment is a pledge or a promise; a convention is a means of monitoring a commitment | it speci es under what circumstances a commitment can be abandoned and how an agent should behave both locally and towards others when one of these conditions arises 16 .
In more detail, one may commit either to a particular course of action, or, more generally, to a state of a airs. Here, we are concerned only with commitments that are future-directed towards a state of a airs. Commitments have a n umber of important properties see 16 and 5, pp217 219 for a discussion, but the most important i s that commitments persist: having adopted a commitment, we do not expect an agent to drop it until, for some reason, it becomes redundant. The conditions under which a commitment can become redundant are speci ed in the associated convention | examples include the motivation for the goal no longer being present, the goal being achieved, and the realisation that the goal will never be achieved 5 .
When a group of agents are engaged in a cooperative activity they must have a joint commitment to the overall aim, as well as their individual commitments to the speci c tasks that they have been assigned. This joint commitment shares the persistence property of the individual commitment; however it di ers in that its state is distributed amongst the team members. To minimise the potential drawbacks of this distribution, an appropriate social convention must be put in place. This social convention identi es the conditions under which the joint commitment can be dropped, and also describes how the agent should behave towards its fellow team members. For example, if an agent drops its joint commitment because it believes that the goal will never be attained, then it is part of the notion of`cooperativeness' which is inherent in joint action that it informs all of its fellow team members of its change of state. In this context, social conventions provide general guidelines, and a common frame of reference in which agents can work. By adopting a convention, every agent knows what is expected both of it, and of every other agent, as part of the collective w orking towards the goal, and knows that every other agent has a similar set of expectations.
Having informally introduced commitments and conventions, we n o w present rigorous de nitions. A convention is a set of rules, each rule consisting of a re-evaluation condition and a goal . The idea is that if ever an agent believes to be true, then it must adopt as a goal, and keep this goal until the commitment becomes redundant. Formally, a convention, c, is an indexed set of pairs: c = f k ; k j k 2 f 1; : : : ; l gg where k is a re-evaluation condition, and k is a goal, for all 1 k l.
Joint commitments have a n umber of parameters. First, a joint commitment is held by a group g of agents. Second, joint commitments are held with respect to some goal '; this is the state of a airs that the group is committed to bringing about.
Third, joint commitments are held relative t o a motivation, which c haracterises the justi cation for the commitment. They also have a pre-condition, which describes what must initially be true of the world in order for the commitment to be held. For example, in most types of joint commitment, we do not expect participating agents to initially believe that the object of the commitment, ', is true. Finally, a joint commitment is parameterised by a convention c. Joint commitment is then informally de ned as follows. A group g is jointly committed to a goal ' with respect to motivation , pre-condition , and convention c i :
1. pre-condition is initially satis ed; and 2. every agent i 2 g has a goal of ' until the termination condition is satis ed; 3. until the termination condition is satis ed, if any agent i 2 g believes that the re-evaluation condition of any rule in c is satis ed, then it adopts the goal corresponding to the re-evaluation condition, and maintains this goal until the termination condition is satis ed.
where the termination condition is that one of the goal parts of the convention rules Notice that the motivation, does not appear to be used in the right hand side of this de nition; however, it can appear in the convention rules. To illustrate how commitments and conventions work, we will specify a minimal social convention, that is similar to the Levesque-Cohen model of joint persistent goals JPGs 18 . Let A collective with a such a commitment will have a mental state in which:
initially, e v ery agent does not believe that the goal ' is satis ed, but believes ' is possible; every agent i then has a goal of ' until the termination condition is satis ed see below; until the termination condition is satis ed, then:
if any agent i believes that the goal is achieved, then it will have a goal that this becomes a mutual belief, and will retain this goal until the termination condition is satis ed;
if any agent i believes that the goal is impossible, then it will have a goal that this becomes a mutual belief, and will retain this goal until the termination condition is satis ed;
if any agent i believes that the motivation for the goal is no longer present, then it will have a goal that this becomes a mutual belief, and will retain this goal until the termination condition is satis ed; the termination condition is that it is mutually believed that either: the goal ' is satis ed; the goal ' is impossible to achieve; the motivation justi cation for the goal is no longer present.
To represent systems in which commitments can be dropped for di erent reasons, then all that needs to be changed is the convention. This exibility is only available because conventions are clearly identi ed as a separate concept | for example in 18 the above conditions are hardwired into the de nition of joint commitment, hence the model builders are imposing a de nitive convention and there is no scope for varying agent behaviour according to the complexity of the collaboration.
We use the model of joint commitments to de ne joint i n tentions, which are held by a group g with respect to an action and motivation . which they believe will achieve the desired goal. 4. Team action: During this stage, the newly agreed plan of joint action is executed by the agents, which maintain a close-knit relationship throughout. This relationship is de ned by a convention, which e v ery agent follows.
Although we believe that most instances of CPS exhibit these stages in some form either explicitly or implicitly, we stress that the model is idealised. We recognise that there are cases which the model cannot account for, and we h a ve attempted to highlight such cases wherever appropriate. Our aim is to construct a framework that is complete, in that it describes CPS from beginning to end, but abstract, in that details which might obscure more signi cant points have been omitted. Finally, w e note that in reality, these four stages are iterative, in that if one stage fails, the agents may return to previous stages. In the interests of simplicity, w e h a ve not attempted to represent this aspect in our model.
Recognition
CPS begins when some agent i n a m ulti-agent community has a goal, and recognises the potential for cooperative action with respect to that goal. Recognition may occur for several reasons. The paradigm case is that in which the agent is unable to achieve the goal in isolation, but believes that cooperative action can achieve it. For example, an agent m a y h a ve a goal which, to achieve, requires information that is only accessible to another agent. Without the cooperation of this other agent, the goal cannot be achieved. More prosaically, an agent with a goal to move a heavy object might simply not have the strength to do this alone.
Alternatively, an agent m a y be able to achieve the goal on its own, but may not want to. There may be several reasons for this. First, it may believe that in working alone, it will clobber one of its other goals. For example, suppose I have a goal of lifting a heavy object. I may have the capability of lifting the object, but I might believe that in so doing, I would injure my back, thereby clobbering my goal of being healthy. In this case, a cooperative solution | involving no injury to my back | is preferable. More generally, an agent m a y believe that a cooperative solution will in some way be better than a solution achieved by action in isolation. For example, a solution might be obtained more quickly, or may b e more accurate as a result of cooperative action.
Believing that you either cannot achieve y our goal in isolation, or that, for whatever reason, you would prefer not to work alone, is part of the potential for cooperation. But it is not enough in itself to initiate the social process. For there to be potential for cooperation with respect to an agent's goal, the agent m ust also believe there is some group of agents that can actually achieve the goal.
In order to precisely de ne the conditions that characterise the potential for cooperative action, it is necessary to introduce a number of subsidiary de nitions. First, we require de nitions of single-agent and multi-agent ability: what it means to be able to bring about some state of the world. Rather than complicate the logic further by i n troducing yet another primitive modality, we adapt a w ell-known de nition of ability that was originally proposed by Moore 19 .
As a rst attempt to de ne ability, w e might s a y an agent has the ability t o a c hieve some state ' if it knows of an action that it can perform, which w ould be guaranteed to achieve the state of a airs. We will call this type 1 ability, and de ne it as follows. Note that the action in this de nition is quanti ed de re with respect to the Bel modality 15, p183 . The signi cance of this is that the agent m ust be`aware of the identity' of the action | it must have a rigid designator for it. Thus it is not enough for the agent to believe that there exists some action that will achieve the goal. It must be aware of exactly which action will achieve it. Before proceeding, we prove some results about type 1 ability. First, we show that if an agent has the type 1 ability to bring about some state of a airs, then that state of a airs is actually possible. If an agent has the type 1 ability to bring about some state of a airs, then it believes that state of a airs is possible. An obvious failing of this de nition when measured against our intuitions about ability is that it fails to allow for an agent performing an action in order to nd out how t o bring about some state of a airs. This motivates a de nition of type 2 ability, which allows for the possibility of an agent performing an action in order to nd out how t o bring about a state of a airs. The idea is that an agent will have the ability to bring about a state of a airs ' if either it has the type 1 ability to bring about ' i.e., it knows of some action that it could perform, which is guaranteed to bring about ' directly, or else it has the type 1 ability to bring about a state of a airs where it has the type 1 ability to bring about '. We formalise this as follows. To simplify future de nitions, we will introduce another derived operator, Unable, which has the obvious interpretation.
We shall assume that if an agent is unable to achieve some state of a airs, then it is aware that it is unable to achieve this. We can now more precisely de ne potential for cooperation. With respect to agent i's goal ', there is potential for cooperation i :
1. there is some group g such that i believes that g can jointly achieve '; and either 2. i can't achieve ' in isolation; or 3. i believes that for every action that it could perform that achieves ', i t h a s a goal of not performing .
Note that in clause 1, an agent needs to know the identity of the group that it believes can cooperate to achieve its goal. This is perhaps an over-strong assumption. It precludes an agent attempting to nd out the identity of a group that can achieve the goal, and it does not allow an agent to simply broadcast its goal in the hope of attracting help as in the Contract Net protocol 27 . We leave such re nements to future work. Clause 2 represents the paradigm reason for an agent considering a cooperative solution: because it is unable to achieve the goal on its own. Clause 3 de nes the alternative reason for an agent considering cooperation: it prefers not to perform any of the actions that might achieve the goal. We do not consider the reasons why an agent will not want to perform a particular action | this will be domain-speci c.
Using the various de nitions above, we can now formally state the conditions that characterise the potential for cooperation. 
Team Formation
Having identi ed the potential for cooperative action with respect to one of its goals, what is a rational agent t o d o ? We propose that such an agent will attempt to solicit assistance from a group of agents that it believes can achieve the goal. If the agent is successful, then at the conclusion of this team formation stage, the agent will have brought about in such a group a mental state wherein each member of the group has a nominal commitment to collective action. The group will not yet have xed upon an action to perform, and in fact will not share any kind of commitment other than to the principle of joint action. In particular, there will not yet be a joint i n tention: this comes later. How does an agent go about forming a team? The most important point to note is that it cannot guarantee that it will be successful in forming a team: it can only attempt it. We therefore require a model of attempts. We adopt that proposed by Cohen and Levesque 6, p240 . The idea is that an attempt by agent i to bring about a state ' is an action , which is performed by i with the goal that after is performed, ' is satis ed, but with the intention that at least is satis ed. The ultimate goal of the attempt | the thing that i hopes to bring about | is represented by ', whereas represents`what it takes to make an honest e ort' 6, p240 . If i is successful, then bringing about will be su cient to cause '. Formally, an attempt by i to achieve ' by performing , at least achieving , The team formation stage can then be characterised as the following assumption about rational agents: an agent i, who believes that there is potential for cooperative action with respect to its goal ', will eventually attempt to bring about in some group g, which it believes can jointly achieve ', a state wherein:
1. it is mutually believed in g that g can jointly achieve '; 2. it is mutually believed in g that every agent i n g is individually committed to ', relative t o i still having a goal of '; or, failing that, to at least cause in g 3. the mutual belief that i has a goal of '; and 4. the mutual belief that i believes g can jointly achieve '. will be su cient to cause them to proceed to the next stage of CPS. We leave as unspeci ed the reasons why g may or may not be helpfully inclined to i, as these reasons will be domain speci c. Note that part 2 of the de nition might arguably be dropped: an agent might have its own reasons for agreeing to participate in a cooperative action, that are unconnected with the original request for participation. It is implicit within this assumption that agents are veracious with respect to their goals, i.e., that they will try to in uence the group by revealing their true goal. We do not consider cases where agents are mendacious i.e., they lie about their goals, or when agents do not reveal their goals. The interested reader is referred to 10, pp159 165 for a discussion and formalization of such considerations.
It is useful to introduce a de nition which captures the commitment that agents have to collective action if team formation is successful. We write Pre-Team g ' i i it is mutually believed in g that: i g can jointly achieve '; and ii every agent i n g has a commitment t o ', relative t o i still having a goal of '. If team formation is successful, then for the rst time there will be a social commitment: a commitment b y a group of agents on behalf of another agent.
Plan Formation
If an agent is successful in its attempt to solicit assistance, then there will be a group of agents with a nominal commitment to collective action. But collective action cannot actually begin until the group agree on what they will actually do. Hence the next stage in the CPS process: plan formation.
We s a w a b o ve that a group will not form a collective unless they believe they can actually achieve the desired goal. This, in turn, implies there is at least one action known to the group that will take them`closer' to the goal see the de nition of J-Able, above. However, it is possible that there are many agents that know of actions the group can perform in order to take them closer to the goal. Moreover, some members of the collective may have objections to one or more of these actions. One of the desiderata for our model, discussed in section 2.1, is that agents are autonomous | they have control over their internal state, and will not simply perform an action because another agent w ants them to 33 . It is therefore necessary for the collective to come to some agreement about exactly which course of action they will follow. Such an agreement is reached via negotiation.
Negotiation usually involves agents making reasoned arguments for and against courses of action; making proposals and counter proposals; suggesting modi cations or amendments to plans; and continuing in this way until all the negotiators have agreed a nal result 1 . Negotiation has long been recognised as a process of some importance in multi-agent systems 29, 2 3 . Unfortunately, these analyses demonstrate that negotiation is also extremely complex | a rigorous attempt at formalization is quite beyond the scope of this paper see 20 for a logical formalisation of argumentation. Instead, we simply o er some observations about the weakest conditions under which negotiation can be said to have occurred.
What can we s a y about negotiating a plan? First, we note that negotiation may fail: the collective m a y simply be unable to reach agreement, due to some irreconcilable di erences. In this case, the minimum condition required for us to be able to say that negotiation occurred at all is that at least one agent proposed a course of action which it believed would take the collective closer to the goal. However, negotiation may also succeed. In this case, we expect a team action stage to follow immediately | we shall say no more about team action here, as this is the subject of the next section.
We shall now make the above discussion more precise. First, we de ne joint attempts: what it means for a group of agents to collectively attempt something. As might be expected, joint attempts are a generalisation of single-agent attempts. An attempt by a group of agents g to bring about a state ' is an action , of which g are the agents, performed with the mutual goal that after is performed, ' is satis ed, or at least is satis ed where represents what it takes to make a reasonable e ort. We can now state the minimum conditions required for negotiation to have occurred. Intuitively, the group will try to bring about a state where they have agreed on a 1 It may also involve agents lying, though we shall not consider such cases here.
common plan, and intend to act on it. Failing that, they will bring about a state where at least one of them has proposed a plan which it believed would achieve the desired goal. More formally, if group g are a pre-team with respect to agent i's goal ', then g will eventually jointly attempt to bring about a state in which g are a team with respect to i's goal ', or, failing that, to at least bring about a state where some agent j 2 g, has made g mutually aware of its belief that some action can be performed by g in order to achieve '. We can make some other assumptions about agent behaviour during negotiation. Most importantly, w e assume that agents will attempt to bring about their preferences. For example, if an agent has an objection to some plan, then it will attempt to prevent this plan being carried out. Similarly, if it has a preference for some plan, then it will attempt to bring this plan about. More precisely, if group g are a pre-team with respect to agent i's goal ', and there is some action such that it is mutually believed in g that achieves ', and that g are the agents of , then every agent j 2 g that has a preference that does does not occur will attempt to ensure that does does not occur, by at least making g mutually aware of its preference for against . Note that we are once again assuming that agents are veracious; that they attempt to in uence the team by revealing their true preferences, rather than by lying about their preferences, or not revealing their true preferences.
To formalise the assumption that members make their preferences known, we need to capture the notion of an agent trying to cause and trying to prevent a group performing an action. These are straightforward. Similarly, the assumption that agents who prefer some action not to be performed make the team mutually aware of their preference is captured as follows. j = 9 Pre-Team g ' i ^M-Bel g Agts g ^Achieves ' 8j j 2 g Goal j Doesn't ATry-to-prevent g :
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If the plan formation phase is successful then the team will have a full joint commitment to the joint goal, and will have agreed to the means by which they will pursue their joint goal 2 .
Team Action
If a collective is successful in its attempt to negotiate a plan, then we expect that collective to follow up negotiation with action. Moreover, they mutually believe that the action they intend to perform in order to achieve ' can actually happen.
Desiderata Revisited
In section 2.1 we identi ed a number of properties that an adequate theory of CPS should exhibit. We now revisit these properties, and see how our model stands up against them.
Agents are autonomous.
The model predicts that once the agents are formed into a collective, they will attempt to negotiate a plan that they believe will achieve the desired objective. Moreover, they will make their preferences known with respect to such plans, and are not required simply to accept another agent's proposal; they are therefore autonomous. Cooperation can fail.
There are a number of stages at which the cooperation process may fail. First, an agent that has recognised the potential for cooperation may be unable to form a team of agents. Secondly, h a ving formed the team, the agents may b e unable to agree upon a plan of action. Finally, cooperation may fail after a plan has been agreed because of unforeseen circumstances or because one of the agents drops its commitment to the endeavour. Communication is essential.
Although we h a ve not explicitly considered communication, our model is consistent with one of the best current theories of speech acts: in 6 , Cohen-Levesque built a theory in which illocutionary acts are treated as attempts to bring about some mental state in conversation participants 6, p227,pp240 241 . At a n umb e r o f p o i n ts, our model predicts precisely such attempts. For example, in the team formation stage, an agent that recognises the potential for cooperation will perform some action in an attempt to bring about a Pre-Team mental state in some group that it believes can help with its goal. Communication acts are characterised by their e ects. In our model, rational agents will communicate with other agents if they recognise the potential for cooperation with respect to one of their goals. However, our model does not require that agents use any pre-de ned communication language or cooperation protocol. In our model, as in that of 6 , any action can be viewed as communicative, as long as it is performed by an agent in the appropriate circumstances. Agents are r eactive. The model presented above is essentially a set of liveness properties 21 ; this is consistent with the view of agents as intelligent reactive systems, responding in a reasoned way to their goals, and events that occur in their environment. Moreover, the agents have a speci c set of conditions and associated goals speci ed in their convention, which indicate the events they should respond to. Agents initiate social processes. The model predicts that agents will attempt to initiate social interaction if they have some goals which they cannot achieve in isolation or for which they prefer the assistance of others. Moreover, agents will initiate the social process of team planning if they reach the state of being a Pre-Team, and the social process of team planning if they reach the state of being a team. Agents will be mutually supportive.
During the planning phase, the agents support one-another by making sure that they inform their fellow group members if they believe the plan will not achieve its intended aim for whatever reason. During execution, the social convention ensures that agents support one-another by ensuring that others know when they believe the cooperative activity is in di culty.
Discussion
This article has contributed to the theoretical foundations of multi-agent systems by presenting a formal model of the cooperative problem solving process. This four-stage model predicts and describes the circumstances under which agents will recognise the potential for cooperation, and how they will behave when this situation arises, from attempting to build a team, negotiating a collective plan, and acting as a team. We noted that this model is both abstract and idealised: there are cases that it does not consider, and no doubt some assumptions have been made that are either too strong or too weak. Nevertheless, we are aware of no other attempt to formalise the cooperative problem solving process in this way.
The fundamental nature and form of the model was deliberately chosen to provide assistance to practitioners who are concerned with developing cooperating agents. The model provides a coherent set of conceptual mechanisms upon which cooperative behaviour can be based. Thus, these mechanisms can be used to identify a cooperating agent's key data structures, the properties that these structures should exhibit, the operations which can be performed on the structures, and the various inter-relationships which exist between the structures. Such models are especially useful when the cooperating agent is to be realised using a traditional symbolic AI architecture since there is a comparatively straightforward mapping between the model and the architecture's separation of concerns.
There are a number of issues that we i n tend to address in future work, the most obvious of which is the need for re nement of the model, including more detailed treatments of the process of recognising potential for cooperation; the process of building a team; the process of negotiation; and the various conventions that may be used for collective action. Finally, we h a ve said nothing about the meta-cooperative process by which agents come to agree on a convention itself: we h a ve taken conventions as given. In real-world cooperative scenarios, such activities are just one part of the cooperative process, that must be addressed by researchers in multi-agent systems.
1. the propositional connectives : not and _ or, and universal quanti er 8; 2. the operator symbols Bel, Goal, Happens, Agts, 2, =, and A; 3. a countable set P r e d of predicate symbols | each symbolP 2 P r e d is associated with a natural number called its arity, given by arityP; 4. a countable set Const of constant symbols, the union of the mutually disjoint sets Const Ag agent constants, Const Ac action sequence constants, Const Gr group constants, and Const U other constants; 5. a countable set V a r of variable symbols, the union of the mutually disjoint sets V a r Ag , V a r Ac , V a r Gr and V a r U ;
6. the action expression constructors`;',`j',`', and`?';
7. the punctuation symbols , , and comma`,'. De nition 24 A term is either a constant o r a v ariable; the set of terms is T e r m .
The sort of a term is either Ag, Ac, Gr or U; i f s is a sort then by T e r m s we mean Const s V a r s . Thus s 2 T e r m s .
Notice that the language contains constants, but no other functional terms. The syntax of well-formed formulae hf m l a i of the language is de ned in Figure 1 .
Note that we demand that a predicate P is applied to arityP terms.
A.2 Semantics
First, some general concepts. It is assumed that the world may b e i n a n y o f a s e t S of states. A state transition is caused by the occurrence of a primitive action or event:
the set of all primitive actions is D Ac . From any state, there is at least one | and perhaps many | possible actions, and hence resultant states. The binary relation R on S is used to represent all possible courses of world history: s; s 0 2 R i the state s could be transformed into state s 0 by the occurrence of a primitive action that is possible in s. Clearly, R will branch in nitely into the future from every state. A labelling function Act maps each arc in R to the action associated with the transition.
The world is populated by a non-empty set D Ag of agents. A group over D Ag is simply a non-empty subset of D Ag ; the set of all such groups is D Gr . Agents and groups may easily be related to one-another via a simple typed set theory. Agents have beliefs and goals, and are idealised reasoners. The beliefs of an agent are given by a belief accessibility relation on S in the usual way; similarly for goals. Every primitive action is associated with an agent, given by Agt . Finally, the world contains other individuals chairs, pints of beer, etc. given by the set D U . A complete formal de nition of the language semantics will now be given. First, paths a.k.a. fullpaths will be de ned: a path represents a possible course of events through a branching time structure.
De nition 25 If S is a non-empty set and R is a total binary relation on S then a path over S; R is an in nite sequence s u : u 2 IN such that 8u 2 IN, s u 2 S and s u ; s u+1 2 R. The set of all paths over S; R is given by pathsS; R. The head of a path p = s 0 ; : : : is its rst element s 0 , and is given by hdp. We will also require that the logic satis es the following strong realism constraint. j = 8i Goal i E' Bel i E'
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Thus if an agent has a goal that ' is possibly satis ed, then it believes that ' is possibly satis ed. The semantic constraint corresponding to this axiom is quite intuitive, but we omit it in the interests of brevity | the reader is referred to 22, pp317 333 for a discussion. 21 The A operator thus has the properties of a normal modal operator based on a universal relation, and thus analogues of the modal axioms KT5 modal system S5 hold for this operator 4, p98 ; also, a version on necessitation holds.
The following theorem captures some simple properties of action expressions and the Happens operator that are used in our proofs see 5, p229 for others. 
